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Improving the livelihoods of  the poor and marginalized in
Nepal through leasehold forestry and livestock program:
A review of  institutional constraints and opportunities
B.R. Regmi1,  A. Albano2, C. Kumar2, G.B. Sharma1
The study looks at the opportunities and constraints of the contributions made by forest
institutions to improve the livelihoods of the poorest, through an analysis of the Leasehold
Forestry (LF) programme  in Nepal – a forestry programme that aims to help alleviate
poverty of forest dependent communities by leasing degraded land to the poorest. Data
and analysis were primarily based from review of literature, consultations with key
informants, field visits, and complemented by the authors’ direct involvement in the
implementation of LF programme. Although intended to improve the lives of the poorest,
the LF programme could negatively affect the poorest when it excludes them or when it
causes their displacement from the land that the poorest depend for their livelihoods.
Such negative impacts of LF program can be attributed to its improper implementation
and design. To improve its effectiveness and impact, awareness campaigns should be
improved using diverse modes of communication, more line agencies should be involved
in the implementation by transferring the implementation responsibility to a district-level
project coordination committee, and some programme provisions should be changed in
favour of the poor.
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An increasingly popular school of  thought onimproving the livelihoods of  the poor is to
increase their access to the resources or “assets” they
needed to make a living, by reforming institutions
governing access, more favorable for the poor. This
school of  thought has been apparent in the trend of
national forest policies of  developing countries
towards community-based forest management, which
in principle, gives forest communities greater access
rights to forest resources. However, despite changes
in forest policies, it is a fact that many forest
communities still have difficulty accessing forest
resources. Notwithstanding the complexity of
improving the livelihoods of  poor forest
communities, such difficulty underscores the
constraints in implementing new, and presumably,
more favorable institutions.
In Nepal, the shift in national forestry policy towards
greater access for forest users has resulted in the
institutionalization of  various Community based
Forest Management (CBFM) programmes. One of
these programmes is the Leasehold Forestry
Programme (LFP) which aims to improve the
livelihoods of  the poorest, by offering them access
rights over degraded forest land. Although various
studies have demonstrated the positive impacts of
the LFP, other studies have also pointed out many
of  its limitations. One such limitation is in its
ineffective implementation (Thoms et al. 2006).
This paper looks at the implementation aspect of
institutional reform for the case of  the LFP in Nepal.
This study aims to develop a better understanding
of  the processes in the formation and make up of
forestry institutions as well as the constraints on their
effective implementation. In doing so, this study
describes the existing forest institutions in Nepal,
focusing on the LFP, in particular; identifies
institutional constraints for its effective
implementation; and recommends measures to
improve the LFP or other similar forestry
programmes in favor of  the poorest. This study was
conducted primarily through a review of related
literature; consultations with key informants involved
in the LFP; field visits to leasehold and community
forest user groups; and from the authors’ experiences
working with Leasehold Forestry User Groups
(LFUGs).
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Materials and methods
The study was carried out through a desk study of  a
number of  published and unpublished literature on
community forestry, leasehold forestry and other
related subjects in Nepal; supplemented with
consultation of  the stakeholders; and the
Collaboration/Conflict, Legitimacy, Interest and
Power (CLIP) analysis.
The review of  forestry and livelihoods related key
literatures focused on the critical analysis of the
current situation and how different programs and
approaches were addressing it. Besides, various
journal articles were also reviewed. Workshop
proceedings were important sources of  information
for analyzing recent research and development
highlights in the forestry sector of  Nepal, and over
viewing what is happening in forestry sector now?
who is doing what? and what are the good practices
and lessons learnt? Program and project related
papers, the review reports and technical papers were
also relevant to the analysis. The documents of
various projects and programmes were useful in
analyzing the approaches and strategies for inclusion,
governance and sustainable resource management in
community forestry.
Consultations were made with government staffs, I/
NGOs personnel and the CFUGs working in
community forestry and leasehold forestry in Nepal.
This was done through series of  meetings with
relevant stakeholders including government line
agencies. A number of  consultation meetings were
organized both at individual and organizational levels
during the preliminary stage of  the study. The main
objective of  this consultation was to collect relevant
literature, inform them about the study as well as to
gauge their perceptions about the research problem.
Furthermore, a brief  questionnaire was used to
capture the perceptions of  different stakeholders in
understanding the current socio-structural context
and their suggestions for improvement.
One-day stakeholder meeting was organized whe
major stakeholders of  CF and LF were invited. The
workshop venue was used to carry out CLIP analysis3.
CLIP tool was used in this study in order to ascertain
various opportunities and constraints as perceived
by ‘key stakeholders’ in the forestry sector. The CLIP
workshop included representation from CFUGs,
LFUGs, researchers as well as partners and other
stakeholders from government agencies.
Result and discussion
The leasehold forestry programme
The LFP is one of  the community-based forest
management (CBFM) programmes being
implemented by the Government of  Nepal. It was
first initiated in 1993 through the implementation
of  the first leasehold forestry project called the Hills
Leasehold Forestry and Forage Development Project
(HLFFDP). This was introduced primarily due to the
widespread discrimination of  the poorest, observed
within the CFUGs, formed in the earlier CF
programme and the necessity to mainstream the poor
and marginalized groups into the  overall national
development.
Basically, LF is similar to CBFM programmes wherein
forest users are organized into Forest User Groups
(FUGs) and are awarded with rights and
responsibilities to manage a patch of  forest. The
LFUGs have the same organizational structure and
institution-making process as CFUGs. They prepare
an Operational Plan (OP) with substantial assistance
from the forest rangers. The LFP, however, tries to
target the poorest members of  the forest community
and hands over degraded ‘forests’ through a 40-year
leasehold agreement. As the LFP specifically targets
the poorest of  the poor4, the groups are smaller in
size, with around 5 to 15 members in one Leasehold
Forest User Group (LFUG).  Due to the livestock
promotion component, LFP involves the
Department of  Livestock (DoLS) and other local
service providers besides Department of  Forest
(DoF) in its implementation.
Impacts
The programme demonstrated success in achieving
its objective of  improving the livelihoods of  its
targeted poorest. Studies show that it (i) increased
the assets of  the poor, especially their livestock
holdings (ii) improved the productivity of  women
and their participation in group activities and
decision-making; and (iii) increased school attendance
3 Collaboration/Conflict, Legitimacy, Interest and Power (CLIP) is a social analysis tool used in understanding the dynamics of
stakeholders, their interest, power and legitimacy
4 The poorest are to be identified based on the National Planning Commission (NPC)’s poverty threshold criteria which are based on
type of  dwelling, land/asset holding and food security.
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and improved nutrition of  the member-households
especially of  their children (Ohler 2003; HLFFDP
2003). The evidences of  positive impacts provided a
strong rationale for International Fund for
Agriculture Development (IFAD) and the
Government of  Nepal to continue to support the
approach of  the programme, creating the Leasehold
Forestry and Livestock Programme (LFLP) which
would continue to implement the strategies of  the
HLFFDP and extending it further to 26 more
districts.
Despite its achievements, several studies have also
revealed constraints in the programme. Although the
programme intends to target the poorest
communities, many studies have demonstrated that
in reality many of  such households were left out and
as a result, were further impoverished (Grinten and
Dhakal 1997; Schuler 1997; Joshi et al 2000; Dhakal
and Yadav 2000; Bhattarai et al 2003; Baral and Thapa
2003). The programme also resulted in conflict
between LFUG and non-LFUGs, usually due to
conflict over rights to the land being handed over
and conflict over who are supposed to be included
within the LFUGs (see for example Bhattarai, et al
2003; LI-BIRD 2004).5
Considering its further extension and expansion into
a national programme, the obvious direction for
improvement is to further increase its positive impacts
while minimizing or eliminating its negative impacts.
These require an analysis of  the causes of  its negative
consequences and constraints.
Issues and constraints
There are various issues and constraints about the
LFP that are cited in the literature. Given our focus
on institutional constraints, we may limit the issues
about the constraints on its implementation, and less
on its provisions or design. We may present these
issues at different levels of  implementation i.e. at the
community, programme and implementation, and
policy level.
Constraints at community level
A primary issue at the community level is about equity,
particularly the exclusion of  the poorest in the
programmes and eventually from the benefits
generated from it; in some cases, the displacement
of  the poorest, in case of  communities involved in
shifting cultivation, as a consequence of  this
programme. Various reasons were offered to explain
the exclusion of  the poorest. One of  these is the
lack of  awareness of  the LF programme. The
evaluation report of  LFLP shows that not all the
poor households received prior information about
the selection of  LFUG members. In many cases,
these were reinforced by the remote geographical
location of  the poorest and poor infrastructure which
limits the flow of  information and mobility of  the
people (LFLP, 2005). As a result, there are evidences
where some middle class and even richer households
are included in the LFUGs (see Baral and Thapa 2003
and Bhattarai, 2003). These studies support the earlier
study by Grinten and Dhakal (1997) which revealed
that many leaseholder households are large land-
holding farming families. In addition, some of  the
Leasehold Forest (LF) members have dropped out
as they could not fulfill some requirements of LF
membership such as regular attendance in meetings
and other leasehold forestry activities which are
required to maintain membership (LI-BIRD, 2004).
Implementation constraints
Obviously, the exclusion of  the poorest is the
opposite of  what the programme intended to do and
do not follow the design of  the leasehold forestry
implementation process. Many of  the negative
impacts of  the programme can thus be attributed to
its weaknesses in its implementation, particularly, the
lack of  capacity of  its main implementing agency and
weakness in monitoring implementation to conform
to the appropriate process of implementation as
designed.
Lack of capacity of DFOs
Although a multi-partner programme, the LF is still
primarily being implemented by the DoF through its
District Forest Office (DFOs), who are also
implementing other CBFM programmes. Definitely
for the DFOs and their forest rangers, the
implementation of  another programme would mean
additional work. With no additional multidisciplinary
staff  besides forestry added to implement the LFP,
the DFO and their staff  would have to juggle their
time and resources to accommodate the LFP, often
resulting in shortcuts in the processes; and
consequently, to lesser quality output. In addition,
rangers often manage to provide training to groups
5 The Programme is also criticized for low impact (i.e. very few people benefited) considering the investment made of  around US$ 17
million implemented within seven years (see Yadav and Dhakal 2000).
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even without much experience and expertise in the
subject matter. Partly the problem lies in the limitation
of  both human and financial resources.
Lack of  monitoring and weaknesses in evaluation
In principle, the LFP process of  handing over forests
to the poorest tries to minimize exclusion of  the
poorest as it is for this reason that this programme
was introduced in the first place. However, as was
demonstrated above, in many cases, forest handovers
and the selection of  recipients were not done as was
designed or intended. Much of  these constraints can
be attributed to how programme implementation is
monitored and outputs evaluated. Although
participatory monitoring and evaluation was
mentioned as one of  the features of  the programme,
in reality, this is hardly done. Outputs are measured
at the end of the project mostly based on quantity
(e.g. number of  households organized; area of
degraded forests covered; number of  training
provided) rather than on quality (i.e. number of
households getting off  the poverty line; sustainability
of  livelihood projects implemented, and of  LFUG
groups). Communities often complain that the visit
of  rangers will be negligible immediately after the
first year of  implementation (LI-BIRD, 2004).
Because of  the emphasis on quantity outputs, line
agencies often do not follow the ideal processes of
implementation. Instead, they do some ‘shortcut’
methods such as not consulting the whole community
in the identification of  degraded land or in identifying
the poorest, which could then later result to conflicts
and unfair community forest institution through the
LFP6.
Design constraints
The constraints in the effective implementation of
the programme can also be further attributed to its
design.
Lack of  capacity of  User groups
Many of the constraints earlier mentioned can be
attributed to the fact that the people being targeted
and organized are the poorest. Being poor, they
cannot afford to invest their time and resources to
activities other than those that will give them
immediate returns. They also lack the power to
prevent other people from claiming their rights like
the ones being provided through the LF programme.
They are often illiterate, living remotely, or indebted
to the better off households in their neighborhood7.
These groups (particularly the genuinely poorest)
need more than just two years of  institutional and
technical support but apparently, the project
implementation is designed for such a short period
of  capacity building.
The lack of  capacity of  the LFUGs can also be
attributed to their very small membership
composition. The current leasehold groups range
from 5-15 households, which are very small compared
to CFUGs or other farmers group. This is a
disadvantage when accessing external support since
NGOs and other civil society organization look for
a sizable community groups for collaboration and
work. For example, there would be a problem
registering LFUGs with the District Agriculture
Development Office (DADO) and other district line
agencies which require larger membership for them
to provide support services.
Limited livelihood options under LF
Under the LFP, the cultivation of  cereal crops is
prohibited; only grasses, fodder, and trees are allowed.
For a poor farmer who cultivates vegetables or cereal
crops on a ‘degraded’ land, converting the land as a
leasehold forest would mean that he/she will no
longer be allowed to cultivate them. Growing grasses
or trees would not be rational because it would take
months or even years before they are harvested. On
the other hand, once the land being cultivated by these
poor farmers are identified as degraded land, they
would have not much choice but to yield since they
do not have ownership rights over these lands because
according to law, these are government-owned land8.
Opportunities for interventions:  a stakeholder
analysis
In identifying opportunities for interventions, it is
important to have a better understanding of  the LF
institutions – the various interests in shaping them
and their power to influence reform. In this regard,
6 For more discussion and empirical studies on this subject see Thoms et al. 2003; Bhattarai et al. 2003
7 If  the degraded forests is open to any interested lessee/s (not excluding the better off  households), implementation would have
been faster (although it may no longer be a pro-poor endeavor).
8 An example for this case is the Chepang communities that were reluctant to join the programme due to this policy which prohibits
them from growing of  agricultural crops in the sloping land. Since these communities do not have any other alternative land for
growing the crops, they feel insecure about joining the LF programme (LI-BIRD, 2004).
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analysis of  the stakeholders in LF was conducted
through an analytical tool called CLIP9 analysis. This
tool enables a better understanding of the relationship
among the various stakeholders particularly, those
who are bound to be in conflict or to collaborate.
Based on the general commonality in their interest
and mandate on forestry, an initial list of  LF
stakeholders include the government through the
Ministry of  Forests and Soil Conservation (MoFSC),
with its various departments such as the DoF - the
primary government agency that oversees forest in
Nepal, forest users including LFUG and non-LFUG
members, donors including IFAD, and the social
mobilizers including local Non-Governmental
Organizations (NGOs). Most of  these groupings
could still, however, be further categorized into sub-
groups based on their differences in interest on the
forest resources being handed over or over other
benefits from the programme, their legitimacy to
influence leasehold forestry institutions based on
existing law, and their overall power to effect reform
on leasehold forestry institutions.
Within the government, the interests, legitimacy and
power of  the central office is often different from
the implementing line agencies. At the central office,
the LF is managed by a separate office: the LFLP
office. The LFLP office is obligated to coordinate
the implementation of  the programme under the
DoF. It has the power mostly on the implementation
of  the programme as well as partly on the policy or
design of  the programme. Within this group is also
included the National Planning Commission (NPC)
that is responsible for preparing the national poverty
reduction strategy paper for Nepal, which is then used
as a basis in the design of  poverty reduction
programmes such as the LF. At the implementation
level, the programme is mainly being implemented
by the DFO and District Livestock Office.
Altogether, these three government offices (i.e. LFLP
central office, DFO, DLSO) have the mandate to
implement the programme and therefore have the
legitimacy. They benefit from the implementation of
the programme and therefore have high interest in
LF. And they have the power to reform or not to
reform the existing LF institutions. Aside from them,
there are also other government agencies that may
have interest or legitimacy to get involved in the LF
programme but currently lack the power to get
involved and influence the implementation. These
include the DADO which has the mandate to
implement agricultural related activities and the
District Development Committee (DDC) which is
the local government body at the district level
authorized to manage district resources (including
forest resources) through the Local Self-Governance Act
of 1998.
The forest users could also be further categorized
into different stakeholders. Foremost of  these would
be the LFUG members as they are the recipients of
the programme. Another sub-group would be those
who were left out particularly the shifting cultivators
who often have claims over the degraded lands but
have high probability of  not being included, and the
rest of  the community members who would not be
members of  the LFUGs, or non-LFUG members.
The list of  LF stakeholders could then include the
LFLP office, DFO, DLSO, DADO, DDC, NPC,
LFUGs, shifting cultivators, non-LFUG members,
IFAD, and the various local NGO contracted as social
mobilizers. These stakeholders and their relationship
based on the analysis of  their legitimacy, interest, and
power can be illustrated in Figure 1 below.
Fig. 1: LF Stakeholder analysis
From the above analysis, and as partially illustrated
in Figure 1, some important observations about the
relationship of  the stakeholders are: a) forest
communities in general have high interest in LF but
lack the legitimacy and power to influence LF
institutions to their favor; b) although LFUGs have
9 Refer to http://www.sas-pm.com/ for details about the tool
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high interest and legitimacy to influence LF policies,
they lack power to do so. This is true for other line
agencies such as the DDC and DADO, and even the
NGOs involved in social mobilization process; and
c) among the government line agencies, the highest
stake, legitimacy and power over LF institutions is
mostly concentrated with the DoF through the LFLP
at the central office and the DFOs at the districts.
The NPC also has the legitimacy and power to
influence the design of  the programme, but its
interest in intervening with LF institutions is limited.
Other stakeholders that have high interest, legitimacy,
and power to change LF institutions are IFAD and
DLSO. This shows that most of  the interventions
towards institutional reforms can mostly be done by
the government policy-makers and implementers.
Discussion and direction for
interventions
Given the various institutional constraints at different
levels and the analysis of  the roles of  the various
stakeholders, various areas can be identified for
interventions to improve the implementation and
impact of  the LFP.
Community level
The dominant issue under at the community-level is
exclusion of  the poorest with the forest rangers not
following the process of  selection of  the poorest and
degraded land. Intervention should be done to find
out whether  the process is strictly followed at the
community level or not.
One way to do this is to improve the awareness of
the communities towards LFP. To do this, innovative
means of  information dissemination need to be
considered. This may include placing posters (about
the process of  handover) in places frequented by the
poorest, and use of  local radio to reach out those at
remote locations. It was also mentioned that LFUGs
do not have constitution that states these rights and
responsibilities. In a way, this is due to the reality of
preparing a constitution (which for LFUGs would
need heavy external assistance just like the preparation
of their OPs). On the other hand, LFUGs are being
organized into inter-groups and cooperatives which
necessitate their preparation of  their constitution and
by-laws. Intervention should target improving the
awareness of  LFUG members of  their rights and
responsibilities, including support for the formation
of  inter-groups and common-interest associations.
Community awareness campaign may also target not
just the recipients but also the wealthier and the
privileged groups in the community, with the aim of
changing their attitude to be more favorable for the
poorest.
Programme implementation level
Both DFOs and DLSOs – the primary implementing
agencies of  the programme - are limited in their
capacity partly by their number of  staff  but especially
their sectoral mandate, resulting in their limited
collaboration with other line agencies. Programme
implementation then needs to involve other
government line agencies in the implementation of
the programme such as the DADO, District Soil
Conservation Office, and the DDC.
A district-level project coordination committee
should be formed to manage or supervise the
implementation of  the LFP. This committee shall be
under the chairmanship of  the DDC chairperson.
Following the Local Self-Governance Act of  1998 which
provides the DDC greater jurisdiction over forest
resources, the DDCs have the mandate to implement
government programmes at the district level and to
coordinate various sectoral activities from various
government departments. The DFO could be the
secretary of  the DDC while other district line
agencies including representatives from NGOs and
user groups shall be members. This reorganization
in the implementation of  the programme is needed
because the poorest have diverse needs (such as food
and nutrition, education, health, income, etc.) and they
need integrated and varying interventions to address
these needs
This recommended reorganization in the
implementation of  the LF programme surely would
need clarification on the roles of  the line agencies
involved, or that shall be involved. A very important
issue that would need to be resolved (as this would
be the main source of  controversy) would be the
distribution of  programme and project funds (i.e.
what are the incentives for getting involved in the
programme?). Definitely, the DFO will oppose
reducing their share of  the budget while all other
will want their share. Since this is a controversial issue,
further discussion involving the various stakeholders
is recommended. On the other hand, we suppose
that this re-organization would take some processes
and time to be resolved. Furthermore there exists a
number of  complications in coordination not just
Regmi et al.
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among the line agencies but between them and other
stakeholders such as the donor agency (IFAD),
national coordinating body (i.e. LFLP), and LFUGs.
A way forward is to conduct a pilot project that would
implement the programme with the proposed
organizational structure to see how this
recommendation can actually be realized.
Programme design level
Although many of the constraints discussed can be
attributed to the design of  the programme (e.g.
limitations in land quality, cultivable crops, land area,
membership composition), it is a fact that changing
such design or provisions have their own rationale
or purpose (e.g. to improve forest cover). Changing
legal provisions is not easy either because of  the
lengthy process of  policy-making or because such
provisions are often controversial. Changing the
provisions of  the LFP has to start by facilitating a
dialogue among the concerned stakeholders  to
discuss and compromise that ideally will satisfy the
interests of  the stakeholders, and particularly the
poor. The smaller leasehold groups of  the same
locality or VDC (5-15 members) including other
existing groups of  discipline should be federated to
a coordination committee so that it can minimize
duplication and facilitate wise use of  resources. These
dialogues may be initiated by those representing the
interest of  the poorest such as the civil society
organizations including the organization of  forest
users (eg. FECOFUN, NEFUG); or could better be
initiated by IFAD using its power to influence actions
of  the respective government agencies.
Conclusion
Institutional reform not only require changes in the
rules or policy provisions but especially support to
make sure that such changes are implemented
properly. Implementation of  changes by the
concerned forestry institutions has, however, become
complex by the presence of  various conflicting
interests over forest resources. These interests are
needed to be understood in order to understand how
such institutions are shaped and how they can be
made more favorable for the interest of  the poor.
Furthermore, implementation of  changes is made
difficult by the lack of  capacity of  implementing
agencies; for forest institutions and poverty alleviation
programs, by the sectoral nature of  government
implementing agencies. Institutional reform needs to
be complemented by capacity building support. In
the case of  forestry programs with integrated
approaches to livelihoods improvement, capacity
building may mean implementing the programme
alongside other sectoral agencies.
Acknowledgements
The authors are grateful to the Centre for
International Forestry Research (CIFOR) and  IFAD
for the opportunity awarded to carry out this study.
The authors would like to highly acknowledge the
guidance, supervision and technical input provided
by Govinda Kafley, and Brian Belcher during the
study. We would also like to appreciate the support
provided by Dr. Pratap Kumar Shrestha, Diwakar
Poudel, Nirmal Duwadi, Santanu Regmi, Dhurba
Acharya, Govinda Sharma, Gyan Bandu Sharma,
Erica Udas, Laxman Gautam, Arjun Dhakal, Arjun
Basnet, Dr. Bhuwon R.  Sthapit,  Anu Adhikari and
Bir Bahadur Tamang.  Finally, the authors would like
to extend their sincere thanks to all the stakeholders
and professional experts for sharing their views and
input.
References
Baral, J. C. and Thapa, Y. 2003.  Nepal’s Leasehold
Forestry for the Poor: The other Side of  the Coin’,
In  Timsina, N. P. and H. Ojha Eds. (2004). Case
Studies on Equity and Poverty in the Management of
Common Property Resources in Nepal. Proceedings of
the National Workshop on Management of
Common Property Resources and Equity:
Exploring Lessons from Nepal, May 28, 2003.
Bardhan, P. 2005. Institutions matter, but which
ones?’ Economics of  Transition, 13 (3): 499-532.
Bebbington, A. 2000. Reencountering development:
livelihood transitions and place transformations
in the Andes,’ Annals of  the Association of  American
Geographers, 90(3): 495-520.
Bhattarai, B., Ojha, H. and Humagain, Y. 2004. Is
Leasehold Forestry Really a Pro-Poor Innovation?
Evidences from Kavre District, Nepal’, Journal of
Forest and Livelihoods. Vol 4 (2), February 2005.
Bhattarai, B., Ojha, H. and Humagain, Y. 2003. Equity
through exclusion? Leasehold forest and livelihood of  the
poor, a case study of  Charpipal LFUG, Bhagavatisthan,
Kabre, Kathmandu’, ForestAction (unpublished
draft).
Grinten, P. v.d. and Dhakal, H. H.1997. Household
Impact Study II Volume: Main Report’, Hills
Regmi et al.
17
Banko Janakari, Vol. 18, No. 2
Leasehold Forestry and Forage Development
Project, Kathmandu, Nepal.
HLFFDP. 2003. Hills Leasehold Forestry and Forage
Development Project: Interim Evaluation, Volume 1
Main Report. IFAD- Office of  Evaluation, Italy.
LFLP. 2005. Leasehold Forestry and Livestock Programme
Design Document-Appraisal’, Main Report.
LI-BIRD. 2004. Documentation innovations in
Shifting Cultivation Areas of  Nepal. Nepal Case
studies.
Ohler, F.M.J. 2003. The impact of  leasehold forestry on
livelihoods in Nepal’, Paper presented to the XIIth
World Congress of  Forestry, Quebec, Canada,
September 21-28, 2003.
Schuler, K. 1997. Intent of  Integration of  Community
Forestry and Leasehold Forestry in Ramechhap,’ Seminar
on Leasehold Forestry and Forage Development
for the poor. August 24-28, Hills Leasehold
Forestry and Forage Development Project,
Kathmandu.
Scoones, I. 1998. Sustainable rural livelihoods: a framework
for analysis,’ Institute of  Development Studies
(IDS), Brighton.
Thoms, C. 2004. Livelihoods forestry in Rural Nepal: the
need for partnership,’ A Paper Presented at the 2004
Rural Sociological Society’s 67th Annual Meeting
in Sacramento, California.
Yadav, R.P., and Dhakal, A. 2000. Leasehold Forestry
for Poor: An Innovative Pro-Poor Programme in the Hills
of  Nepal’, Policy Outlook Series No. 6,
Kathmandu: HMGN Ministry of  Agriculture/
Winrock International, Programme on Policy
Analysis in Agriculture and Related Resource
Management.
Regmi et al.
